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The Politicization of Crime and Its Implications 
By: Komysha Hassan
Faculty Mentor: Dr. Jonathan Knuckey
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ABSTRACT: The relationship between law enforcement and the public has recently come under scrutiny after a 
number of high-profile deaths of African-Americans at the hands of police officers. The ensuing public outcry has 
given way to a wide-ranging debate about the origins of such tension and why it has continued to manifest with such 
vigor despite apparent progress. This research attempts to uncover the underpinnings of this tension through a historical 
review of the development of the law enforcement institution and the narrative of crime in society. Specifically, this 
research investigates the role of federalization and politicization on crime and its impact on the relationship between 
law enforcement and the public. My findings suggest that the politicization of crime has created a false narrative that 
distorts the racial and class composition of crime, unnecessarily favors use of force and confrontational contact with 
the public, and compromises the integrity of crime statistics and their collection.  This false narrative undermines the 
core objective of law enforcement — public safety — and negatively impacts its institutional goals and mindset, the 
implications of which reach beyond the police to society at large and the policies that define criminality and shape 
crime control.
KEYWORDS: police; law enforcement; politicization; politics; public policy; federalization; police power; crime; 
crime narrative; penal; police institution
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INTRODUCTION
The public outcry that followed the 2014 shooting death 
of Michael Brown, a young African-American man, by 
a police officer in Ferguson, Missouri brought to the 
forefront the issue of police violence and excessive use 
of force, particularly against African-Americans. But the 
issue is not a new one. A similar incident took place in 
1991 when a number of Los Angeles Police Department 
officers beat Rodney King1 following a traffic stop. 
Though nearly a quarter of a century has passed between 
the two incidents, it appears as if little has fundamentally 
changed. Racism and racial tension in law enforcement 
and society has been addressed by a large body of 
research; however, the politicization of crime and its role 
in racializing crime, as well as the impact of federalization 
on crime control, has been less thoroughly scrutinized. 
Owing to Scheingold (1984) and Reasons (1974), 
the concept of the politicization of crime has become 
more prevalent in scholarly research. In this paper, the 
politicization of crime is defined as the use of the crime 
issue as a political tool or construct to further policy 
and political agendas. As research by Murakawa (2005) 
and Lynch (2008) indicates, racialization of crime is a 
consequence of politicization rather than the inverse. 
Hence, we must look more closely at the politicization 
of crime control, particularly in the years leading up 
to and following the Civil Rights era of the 1960s, 
to understand the link between politics and crime. 
Federalization presents another angle of politicization. 
The ever-expanding role of the federal government in 
the process of crime control has had a profound effect 
on how law enforcement conducts itself and the types of 
crimes given the most attention.
This paper uses archival research to identify the historical 
link between the federalization and politicization of crime 
and its impact on the institution of law enforcement. It 
is not the intention of this research to be a commentary 
on racialization, but because race plays an integral role 
in the operationalization and exercise of crime control 
in the United States, inevitably it must be included. The 
public’s understanding of crime in society has evolved 
over time, and with the advent of social media and 
sharing platforms, the public has become more aware of 
crime beyond its political characterization. Despite this 
growing awareness, there remain disparities in the public’s 
perception of crime versus actual crime rates, which are 
also evident in the institution of law enforcement. 
This paper proceeds in three parts. First, I overview 
the State’s2  police power to better understand the role 
and development of the institution of law enforcement. 
Manning (1999) and Cummings (1979) provide useful 
background on the evolution of police power in this 
aspect, while Reiner (2010) explicates the confluence of 
politics and law enforcement. Secondly, I scrutinize the 
federal shift in crime control, particularly with respect 
to its impact on the law enforcement institution and 
how crime has been quantified and variously controlled. 
The extensive research of Beckett and Sasson (2003), 
Schiengold (1984), and Simon (2009) document the 
evolution of crime’s politicization, as well as how the 
politics of crime has impacted other aspects of society. 
Simon (2009) and Surette (2006) provide further 
support for the influence of politicization on the crime 
narrative and the public perception of crime. Thirdly, I 
analyze the crime narrative itself, taking into account the 
influences addressed in the previous two sections. This 
narrative is an important component of the racialization 
of crime and how the public sees criminals, the agents of 
crime control, and the process of remediation. Findings 
by Lynch (2008) provide some of the most compelling 
evidence of the evolution of the crime narrative from a 
political point of view. This research will then elucidate 
further the larger social effects of the politics of crime.
THE COERCIVE POWER OF THE STATE
Criminal law is the set of the codified rules and norms 
of society that dictate the parameters of order, defining 
what is normal and what is deviant and more broadly 
constituting who is accepted and who is ostracized. 
When individuals deviate from the publicly and socially- 
accepted conception of order and normalcy they become 
criminals, having broken one or more of those codified 
rules and norms. Society’s perception of rules and norms 
are not static and change over time and space (Richerson, 
Mulder, and Vila 2001). What is considered deviant at 
a certain point in history may shift at a later time, and 
what may be labelled as normal in a particular region may 
be considered deviant in another. Therefore, laws also 
change in response to these societal shifts because order 
and peace as the objectives of the state are only made 
possible by rejecting those presumed to be deviants based 
on the current perception. This dialectical construction 
of the relationship between law and criminality is 
fundamental to understanding the changes that occur in 
societal acceptance or rejection of certain behavior and 
the agents that promote and enforce it.  
11.2: 39-53
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Though, in principle, the public defines what is socially 
accepted or rejected, the ability to  define deviance 
belongs to the state and is a powerful exclusionary 
political device (Michalowski 2000). Therefore, norms 
are often the product of politics and specific interests 
(Reiner 2010). When it is expedient for the state to 
create new classifications of deviance, or even abolish 
old ones, the public is enlisted to adopt such new 
distinctions. This process empowers the state to codify 
the newly recognized norms and enforce them (Reiman 
1984). Because of the enormous power contained in the 
social construction of crime, the potential for abuse is 
considerable. 
The above framework of law also grants the state its 
police power— that is, its legitimate power to enforce the 
law and maintain order. Maintaining order is primarily a 
peacekeeping mandate, with enforcing law on the coercive 
end of the spectrum (Cummings 1965; Manning 1999). 
It is clear from our previous discussion on normalcy 
and deviance, as it relates to the construction of crime, 
that deviance is the exception: the anomaly that invokes 
coercive power to control it. Order therefore only entails 
the police’s peacekeeping role, arguably the central role 
for any domestic law enforcement entity (Cummings 
1965). 
Though police power extends to coercive force, such force 
is presumably limited to serving a specific, restricted 
purpose: to protect the collective from the deviance 
of a few. The legitimacy of this force stops when the 
transgression has ceased or where its power to sanction 
has been exhausted (Simon 2009). This is to say nothing 
of the degree of force used or the degree of transgression 
that would elicit it. The use of force is also constructed, 
dependent on the context and the individual towards 
whom the force is directed. The specifics regarding 
reasonable use of force are beyond the scope of this paper; 
however, the narratives of crime and criminality, and law 
enforcement’s mandate and organizational identity, all 
exert significant power over how, when, and on whom 
force is used and to what degree (See Beckett and Sasson 
2003; Ghandnoosh 2014; Lynch 2008; Murakawa 2005). 
In 1851, Justice Lemuel Shaw of the Massachusetts State 
Supreme Court, writing for the majority in the landmark 
case Commonwealth v. Alegro, ushered a new term into 
the legal lexicon: “police power.” Shaw defines this term 
as “the power vested in the legislature by the constitution, 
to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome 
and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinance, either with 
penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, 
as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the 
commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same” (Horwitz 
1995). Later, in Jacobson v. Massachusetts (1905), U.S. 
Supreme Court Justice John Harlan would define the 
limits of police power, clarifying that such a power “must 
always yield in case of conflict with the exercise by the 
General Government of any power it possesses under the 
Constitution, or with any right which that instrument 
gives or secures” (Horwitz 1995). 
Given the objective of the state to promote the welfare of 
its citizens and expect their cooperation and contribution, 
law enforcement, generally, has been mandated to carry 
out that power (Bucerius and Tonry 2014). Thus, the 
police represent the coercive power of the state. As part of 
the executive branch (within each level of government), 
the police are inextricably linked to the state as a political 
entity as much as a social, geographic, and ethno-cultural 
one. This linkage is an important component of the 
identity of law enforcement. The political will of the 
democratic state, in theory, serves public interest, and 
even when that theory is loosely followed, maintaining 
order and promoting citizen welfare are essential to the 
security and power of the state (Bucerius and Tonry 2014). 
Therefore, the state enacts laws for the aforementioned 
purposes, using its police power to enforce them. 
Given the considerable potential for abuse due to the 
latitude of police power, the language extending it has 
sought to subordinate and narrowly define it. In both 
early definitions provided by the courts, police power 
was legitimated insofar as its use was “wholesome 
and reasonable” and for “the good and welfare” of the 
public. Further, police power was constrained where it 
contravened constitutional principles or their legitimate 
interpretation (Freund 1976). Ernst Freund’s seminal 
work, “The Police Power,” maintains that the court must 
“not accept as conclusive” the legislative perspective 
of the parameters of power, “but inquire in every case 
whether there is a legitimate exercise of police power” 
(p. 334). Freund also clarifies the strong link between 
the making of the law and its execution, suggesting 
that one is not to be entirely trusted to hold the other 
accountable. As we will see in the next section, the courts 
have played a corrective role on many occasions where 
the legislative interpretation and/or expansion of police 
power overstepped its constitutional limitations and 
encroached on the public’s rights.
The police, historically, operate in a local context as 
well, since crime and other social issues are contextually 
11.2: 39-53
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related to the communities in which they occur. Different 
environments, resources, and populations require different 
responses to highly individualized issues. Furthermore, 
the process of federalization (discussed further in the 
following section) is as much a political undertaking as 
it is a legislative one — the public must be in support 
of such efforts for its success. After all, the American 
federalist system grants great latitude to individual states 
in governing their own affairs with a central government 
of limited powers (Nolan et al. 2018).  
It would be naïve to neglect mentioning the cronyism 
and local politics that characterized many police agencies 
pre-1960 (Bayley and Nixon 2010). City and county 
government officials and local politicians used the police 
to redress political or personal grievances extrajudicially; 
favoritism, corruption, and procedural negligence were 
often regular features of law enforcement. The abuse 
of local police power within this context contrasts with 
federal anti-crime initiatives. In any case, efforts to 
professionalize police were responsive to this conflict 
of interest between serving a limited group of powerful 
individuals and serving public interest. 
The professionalization shift resulted in more organized 
and systematic law enforcement, distanced (if only by 
a few degrees) from local political machinations and 
characterized by greater procedural consistency (Bayley 
and Nixon 2010). However, the conditions, motivations, 
and political forces that propelled professionalization 
also impacted its efficacy as a service organization (Gest 
2001; Maguire 2003). The federalized nature of the 
professional shift led to a more efficient instrument of 
state power defined by control and enforcement.  Though 
professionalization should have pushed the police 
institution towards an increasingly integrated role, it 
instead became further distanced from its peacekeeping 
nature and more entrenched as a protector and advocate 
of state interests (Kraska and Cubellis 1997). 
Given professional accreditation bodies such as the 
American Medical Association (AMA) for doctors 
and the American Bar Association (ABA) for lawyers, 
centralization could have been accomplished through a 
professional accreditation body for law enforcement, like 
the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP). 
Such a body could provide disciplinary, professional 
oversight and standards rather than a political framework. 
The government would have systems for evaluation, 
control, and licensure not unlike those of law and 
medicine. However, the federal political system provides 
much of the support, funding, and strategic leadership for 
law enforcement at local levels, thus shifting agency away 
from police organizations. This phenomenon increasingly 
subordinates these organizations to federalized police 
operations, i.e., the ‘War on Crime’ or the ‘War on 
Drugs’. The deployment of such national initiatives with 
respect to law enforcement can be especially dangerous or 
problematic for a country as diverse and environmentally 
variant  as the United States3. 
THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIME CONTROL
The American political, social, and economic landscape 
was in transition following the end of World War II and 
the economic boom that produced an expanding middle 
class. Racial and cultural tensions rose significantly as 
a result of demographic changes brought on by black 
veterans returning from the war and resettling in new 
demographic patterns, as well as a rapidly growing 
suburban America (Murakawa 2008). Americans turned 
their attention to domestic areas of concern and issues 
of social justice and political transformation. The U.S. 
Supreme Court, reflecting changing public sentiment, 
was at the forefront with a series of decisions that tore 
down decades of precedent, including the separate but 
equal4 doctrine, the end of de jure segregation5, and the 
expansion of due process rights for criminal suspects6.
 
As Simon (2009) indicates, it was in the beginning of 
the sixties that the civil rights movement increased in 
strength and scope. As a result, lawmakers and politicians 
sought to change the narrative of crime to take on the 
protest movements and civil rights advocates who had 
also become increasingly politically active. 
For Southern lawmakers in particular, this narrative 
meant generalizing crime as categorically related to 
particular ‘deviant’ groups (African Americans) rather 
than a consequence of individual behavior (Lynch 2008; 
Simon 2009). 
This approach took on national prominence during the 
Johnson administration when the anti-Vietnam War 
movement, which drove major political demonstrations, 
transformed crime from an individual or group 
behavioral problem to a matter of patriotism and national 
security, both highly political distinctions (Beckett and 
Sasson 2004). Anti-war demonstrators, elements of the 
political order contended, were a threat to the public 
order through their disruptive action, compromising 
national security through their defiance of the State 
11.2: 39-53
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and threatening others’ peace and security for their own 
interests (Rising 2010). By addressing public grievances 
against the government through crime, political dissent 
could be better managed. Dissenters were dismissed as 
criminals, deviants, and subversives (Churchill and Wall 
1990). This shift in the narrative of crime and the profile 
of the ‘criminal’ was instrumental in influencing the 
management of criminal behavior.  
Framing crime as a national security concern changed 
the type of power that could be brought to bear on the 
problem. Up until this point, crime remained relatively 
confined to state and local authority. Federal interest in 
manipulating the crime narrative, framed by J. Edgar 
Hoover’s FBI, lacked the means or the structure to 
systematically implement centralized enforcement (Gest 
2003). That circumstance changed with the passing of 
the Omnibus Criminal Control and Safe Streets Act 
(OCCA), signed by President Johnson in 1968 (Simon 
2009). This expansive legislation included a number of 
civil rights-oriented provisions, chief among them the 
creation of the first criminal justice database for law 
enforcement (LEAA), which collated data for criminal 
justice research focused on social aspects of crime 
(Bucerius and Tonry 2014).
The OCCA shifted aspects of crime control to the 
federal government, providing increasingly centralized 
organization and structure (Simon 2009). This 
centralization was accomplished mainly through 
millions of dollars in block grants to law enforcement, 
giving the federal government increased influence on 
police activities within states and even local jurisdictions 
(Simon 2009). Thereafter, the OCCA continued to 
expand, and numerous other federal laws, of equal or 
greater consequence, followed (Beckett 1997).  
When considered within the historical context of the 
civil rights movement and the social justice revolution of 
the 1960’s and 1970’s, the significance of centralization 
becomes clearer still. American society was undergoing 
profound changes, confronting issues of segregation, 
diversity, and individual rights. The public became 
increasingly exposed to episodes of police violence and 
the racial dichotomy of tensions, mainly between white 
perpetrators and black victims (Surette 2006). Activists 
demanded the political system address clear injustices 
and take a more active role in redressing the grievances 
of the victims (mostly African Americans). The public 
and the courts arrived at conclusions which were often at 
odds with the entrenched political interests of the federal 
11.2: 39-53
and legislative branches (Kamisar 2000). 
Certain political groups found it crucial to control where 
the public located the problem and what individual or 
institution they found responsible. Compiling Gallup 
opinion polling data from 1965 to 1980, Scheingold 
(1984) demonstrates that when presented with open-
ended surveys about the most important issue facing 
the country, Americans consistently ranked issues  other 
than crime as most pressing. With the exception of 
1968-9, and ’73, the percentage of Americans ranking 
crime as a critical issue was below 10 percentage points 
(See Appendix, Table 1). 
This fact indicates that, despite an increasing crime 
rate, the public was still relatively undaunted by this 
phenomenon or its consequences significantly. However, 
when asked using a different survey employing forced 
choice questions7, participants consistently ranked 
crime as the highest priority issue for the same survey 
years compared to other topics (See Appendix, Table 2). 
Scheingold (1984) suggests that this statistical contrast 
indicates that crime in public perception is “latent 
rather than active,” pointing to a “powerful current of 
suggestibility” (43-4). These findings are consistent 
with Beckett and Sasson (2007) who demonstrate that 
public perception and fear of crime is “top-down” (120), 
initiated by political agitation and media coverage. By 
comparison, respondents to open-ended surveys for the 
same time period listed issues relating to civil rights, 
the Vietnam War, and nuclear arms as more significant 
(Scheingold 1984).  
Beckett and Sasson (2007) and Scheingold (1984) 
look more closely at another indicator of public crime 
perception: fear of walking alone at night. With the 
exception of a significant increase between 1972 and 
1975, response trends in both data analyses show that 
rates have remained notably stable over time, declining in 
the past decade. This trend sharply contrasts with crime 
policy initiatives, which have steadily grown in number 
(Beckett and Sasson 2007). Scheingold (1984) also 
shows that elevated negative responses to “fear of walking 
alone at night” surveys are better understood by breaking 
down the data to show the categories of respondents 
most expressive of that sentiment, specifically women 
and minorities in urban areas. In each case, the existing 
“current of suggestibility” creates an opportunity to direct 
public opinion independent of actual crime numbers. 
Despite increased public awareness, recent polling 
demonstrates this divergence, where the public assumes 
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that crime rates are rising despite statistical evidence 
to the contrary (see Figure 1). This particular dataset is 
instrumental to understanding the categories of crime 
that impact public perception strongest, and therefore, 
are the most politically expedient.  
The disparities in public concern over crime and the 
political focus on crime were also reflected in civil rights 
era court decisions. The Warren Court, named after 
Chief Justice Earl Warren, ushered in what is commonly 
referred to as the “due process revolution,” starting in 
1961 with the Court’s landmark decision to disallow 
evidence obtained through illegal search and seizure 
in Mapp v. Ohio (Kamisar 2000). The Court’s other 
landmark decisions in Miranda v. Arizona, Gideon v. 
Wainwright, Terry v. Ohio, and Beck v. Ohio, among 
others, reinforced defendants’ constitutional rights and 
created better defined and enforced rules of criminal 
procedure (Pye 1968). These decisions also limited the 
near impunity law enforcement had grown accustomed 
to of violating defendants’ rights (Pye 1968). The impact 
and significance of the due process decisions by the court 
cannot be overstated; to this day, they incite conservative 
condemnation on the undermining of law and justice 
(Rising 2010). 
Of course, these decisions were responsive to the social 
and civil rights revolutions, noted above, that at once 
demanded and facilitated such decisions. Quoting 
McCloskey, Pye (1968) notes, “The Warren Court’s 
espousal of civil rights was less a matter of deliberate 
choice than of a predictable response to the wave of 
history,” adding, “It may be forcefully argued that the 
increased concern of the Supreme Court in matters of 
criminal justice was almost inevitable” (256). The Warren 
Court’s most notable decisions had not overturned 
precedent either, as some had suggested — many were, 
in fact, broader reiterations of decisions made years prior 
—however, they provided sharp rebukes of violations of 
individual rights by law enforcement within the broader 
context of the rights revolution (Pye 1968). To some 
political interests at the time, that was a particularly 
acrimonious confluence.  
Concurrently, the national crime rate was rising 
significantly. Over the decade, the national crime rate 
more than doubled from nearly 3.4 million incidents in 
1960 to 7.4 million in 1970 (Uniform Crime Reports, 
United States). A wealth of scholarship indicates that the 
incredible social, economic, and foreign policy upheaval 
of the time, including the Vietnam and Cold Wars, the 
civil unrest resulting from public dissent, and the recent 
assassination of a very popular president (President John 
F. Kennedy), were at the root of this surge in criminal 
activity (See Ciment 2015; National Research Council 
2014; Rising 2010). There is also some credence to the 
theory, put forth by Eterno (2007), that law enforcement 
lacked adequate coping strategies to efficiently implement 
the new legal requirements. Those deficiencies also may 
have contributed to some degree of attrition within 
the police force, impacting the crime rate. However, 
conservative lawmakers were quick to associate this trend 
with the “handcuffing of the police” by the liberal Warren 
Court, and the “coddling of criminals” (Rising 2010). 
11.2: 39-53
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These lawmakers stoked racial resentment to associate 
criminality and disorder with the civil rights movement, 
smearing “liberal” policies that supposedly condoned it. 
Never before were the mechanisms of the justice system, 
or academics  and public figures so politically assailed and 
subjected to calls for reform and/or expulsion for their 
stances on crime (National Research Council 2014).  
Conservative and white segregationist anger against 
the Court, stemming from its anti-segregation, anti-
discrimination, and socially reformist decisions well 
before 1961, found a new focal point for admonition: 
crime and law enforcement (Rising 2010). This 
particular event signaled an important shift in public 
policy initiatives, from civil rights to criminal justice. 
Nowhere was the shift more evident than in the 1964 
presidential election, when Republican senator Barry 
Goldwater challenged President Johnson’s “Great 
Society” initiatives with a “law and order” platform that 
promised to “not support or invite any American to seek 
redress… through lawlessness, violence, and hurt of his 
fellow man or damage of his property” (Beckett and 
Sasson 2007, 50). Goldwater, as the National Research 
Council report finds, used “explicit and implicit race-
based denunciations of the civil rights movement” to 
gain white votes (2014, 108). Though crime was indeed 
rising at a significant rate, the statistical incongruities 
between the public’s concerns related to crime and its 
perception, noted by Schiengold (1984), are indicative of 
the capacity to manipulate public response. 
In a clear demonstration of the public’s lack of “outrage” 
towards the crime issue, Goldwater lost his bid 
spectacularly to Johnson, but crime had now become 
front and center in the political arena. Conservative 
lawmakers, having lost both houses of Congress, were 
eager to stoke this trend (Beckett and Sasson, 2007). 
Ted Gest (2001), who conducted interviews with over 
100 officials and congressmen for his book Crime and 
Politics, quotes then-DOJ crime research chief Gerald 
Caplan: “It was understood that the effect of Senator 
Goldwater’s lopsided defeat was not to bury crime as an 
issue, but merely to transfer the official responsibility to 
the democratic administration” (6). 
Soon thereafter, President Johnson declared a “war 
on crime”, creating the Office of Law Enforcement 
Assistance (OLEA), appointing a national crime 
commission, and pushing through Congress the Law 
Enforcement Assistance Act (LEAA), all of which 
radically federalized the administration of criminal 
justice and opened an ever-increasing war chest of 
federal funds to state and local law enforcement (Beckett 
and Sasson 2007; Simon 2009; Lee 2007). Despite the 
pressure, Johnson attempted to take a social science 
and research-based approach to the examination and 
remediation of the crime problem, creating federal 
databases to track law enforcement action and crime 
incidence and apportioning funding to rehabilitation 
programs and other social development (Lee 2007).  
The President’s Crime Commission conducted 
research, surveys, and interviews, involving thousands 
of participants and experts, in an attempt to produce a 
bipartisan and comprehensive report (Gest 2001). The 
commission’s contribution to the development of research, 
professionalization, and public understanding of the 
criminal justice process cannot be understated, with over 
200 recommendations in the final report. However, this 
huge undertaking proved too big for its own good. The 
commission’s work was plagued with political infighting 
and came into conflict with other parts of the federal 
system, most notably J. Edgar Hoover’s FBI (Gest 2001). 
As a result, the most important parts of the report went 
largely unnoticed. 
The migration of the crime issue across party lines would 
have a lasting effect on the politics of criminal justice 
policy across administrations, hindering or altogether 
muting voices that questioned “get tough” policies (Lee 
2007). The passage of the OCCA in 1968, meant to be 
the legislative product of the Commission report, was a 
radical reversal from the Great Society underpinnings of 
previous crime related initiatives, directly undermining 
some of the Supreme Court’s most significant due 
process decisions (Kamisar 2000). Now, the ‘war on crime’ 
fronted all sorts of political finagling, from suppression of 
public dissent to de jure discrimination and segregation 
to score settling with the judiciary (Rising 2010). 
The crime narrative’s success in redirecting the civil 
rights campaign and transferring greater control to the 
state over its subjects, in a particularly punitive sense, led 
to its eventual evolution (Lerman and Weaver 2010). 
Despite the unprecedented expansion of the federal 
role in law enforcement regulation, the scope of federal 
control was still limited, particularly in relation to street 
crime. The main thrust of federal control remained 
through funding, where the allocation of funds would be 
contingent on state and local cooperation in addition to 
implementation of federally recommended or provided 
standards. This barrier to further federal expansion in 
11.2: 39-53
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the area of law enforcement led to the next great shift 
in the political construction of crime: the war on drugs. 
Unlike violent crimes such as murder, rape, and robbery, 
drug offenses fell under federal jurisdiction, providing 
much greater latitude to the federal government in 
crime control (Simon 2009). Shortly after the election of 
President Richard Nixon, the shift in drug control policy 
as a focal point of the war on crime began to take shape. 
 
By increasing the political visibility of crime and linking 
it with drug abuse, President Nixon increased the drug 
enforcement budget more than ten-fold, from $65 
million to $719 million, and the LEAA budget by over 
500%, from $65 million to over $500 million (Beckett 
and Sasson 2007). These staggering expansions of the 
government’s law enforcement resources were only 
possible through the powerful political drive of the crime 
narrative, which tapped into the public’s underlying 
concern about issues of personal security (Scheingold 
1984). President Nixon may have been more vocal 
and unabashed in brandishing crime and punishment; 
however, his successors would continue to use this 
narrative to similar effect in the decades to follow.  
THE NARRATIVE OF CRIME
Eminent in the conversation on crime policy changes 
and implementation is the greater narrative of crime 
within society — its agents and actors. As with most 
publicly accepted narratives, the narrative of crime 
foregrounds all other events related to crime; it shapes 
and influences the way the public responds to it, the 
government deals with it, and society acclimates to it. 
We already discussed public receptivity and reactiveness 
to matters that concern personal security, emphasizing 
the high rate of suggestibility in such topics. Through the 
deployment of powerful, persuasive narratives such as 
patriotism, national identity, personal security, and chaos, 
political and media-based rhetoric reshaped the narrative 
of crime for political expedience. Just as the President 
uses carefully chosen words to reinforce particular 
policy objectives, his words help construct the societal 
narrative surrounding crime. Lynch (2008) chronicles a 
fundamental shift in this narrative coinciding, naturally, 
with the shift in policy starting in the early 1960’s and 
again in the 1980s, with the advent of the “war on drugs.” 
This shift in the definition and image of the “typical 
criminal” was also highly racialized, reflecting the 
political upheaval of the time.  Lynch’s research provides 
the clearest evidence of the interlocking of public policy 
and the shift in narrative.
Lynch (2008) describes three distinct typifications of 
“the typical penal subject:” an 1) old penal subject, a 2) 
transitional penal subject, and a 3) new penal subject 
(Lynch 2008, 90-4). 
Accompanying these individual characterizations is a 
characterization of the system needed to accomplish the 
goals of rehabilitation, containment, or eradication of 
the “penal subject” in question. The “old penal subject,” 
pre-dating the 1960s, was characterized as “a reformable 
being,” someone “who needed to be known and 
understood,” using Garland’s term “penal-welfarism” to 
describe the systemic ideology approaching the criminal 
subject (Lynch 2008, 90). These presumptions about the 
role of the criminal and the state served to develop the 
institutions of the latter not as a permanent destination 
where individuals are cast away, but an interventional 
stage that only in extremely rare cases would dispose of 
its subjects. Lynch (2008) describes this relationship:  
Thus, the criminal/penal subject merely deviated 
on one or more scales from an idealized norm, 
rather than belonging in a quantitatively different 
category of being. And since the penal subject’s 
offending behavior or deviant acts fell within a 
continuum of human behavior, this conception of 
the penal subject held the potential for productive 
change and was generally viewed as worthy of 
state efforts to impel that change (90-1).
Key to this conception is that crime was fundamentally a 
treatment problem that required a level of expertise within 
the system, an expectation of reformation and conditional 
improvement, and a need to address conditions external 
to the “criminal” (Lynch 2008). What proceeded that 
understanding was a sea change in the conception and 
representation of the criminal or “the penal subject.” 
Lynch (2008) notes the competing theories emerging 
regarding crime and the state’s role in intervention borne 
out of the rehabilitative policies and assumptions of the 
Johnson administration and his Crime Commission. 
She also highlights the ultimate success of the largely 
political narrative that distinguished the criminal from 
the average individual. Citing an earlier study by Beckett, 
Lynch (2008) references the use of “law and order” 
rhetoric to shift the public conceptualization of crime 
and criminals: “This political tactic, then, helped shape a 
new construction of the penal subject as one who… was 
a much more significant threat to the nation’s well-being 
than previously conceived” (92). 
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Even more essential was the racial shift that occurred in 
the portrayal of the penal subject, which Lynch (2008) 
documents closely through her research into correctional 
advertising and communication over a fifty-year period. 
This racial shift occurred over two phases, in the 
transitional period of the 1960s and 70s first: “a more 
violent… more irrational, and less redeemable African 
American convict” that joined the former (inevitably 
male) “weak but redeemable white inmate,” and later: 
“a wholly irredeemable ‘other,’ primarily identified as 
African American, who is best incarcerated to protect 
society” (93).  
Comparatively, the first subject, the white inmate, fit 
the treatment model: smaller than his handlers, perhaps 
“sickly,” being led, and the second subject, the darker-
skinned inmate, fit the threat model, “a bulky, muscled 
figure” with a “surly or menacing facial expression,” 
attempting to break loose (Lynch 2008, 93). This 
shift reflects the emerging political narrative of crime 
as an essential threat that needed to be eradicated, 
crushed, or suppressed, but never treated or studied. 
The racially framed “irredeemability” allows also for the 
delegitimization of the concerns and complaints of these 
individuals and elevates their magnitude of threat. 
The transitional period did not last very long, as the 
latter image of the criminal became standardized and 
shifted, perhaps further, towards an even less relatable 
or redeemable ‘other’. Therefore, the new penal subject 
was an evolved version of his transitional counterpart: 
“The imagined prototypical offender in popular, political, 
and even justice policy circles tended to be the scariest 
(although statistically rarest) type of criminal, who need 
not be understood or corrected but who must at any cost 
be contained and disempowered” (Lynch 2008, 94). 
This new conceptualization of ‘the criminal’ was thus 
more simplistic and less complex, placing greater (if not 
all) onus on the individual and therefore an inherent 
defect in their being. Though correctional institutions 
still retained their distinction as being ‘correctional,’ they 
acted more like clearing houses and containment centers 
than places where one might actually expect ‘corrective’ 
measures. Eventually, this characterization of the 
criminal evolved further, drifting far from its health and 
social beginnings to the “super predator” of the 1990s 
(National Research Council 2014). In the interim, the 
penal system was expanding rapidly, cementing its role as 
a repository for “undesirables” that had no other means 
of redress. The common narrative on crime allowed 
criminals to grow more and more distant from ‘normal’ 
members of society and therefore easily discounted and 
shunned as having “chosen” a path of self-destruction, 
rather than being potential victims of a system that fails 
to create opportunities for recovery. Other categories of 
individuals, such as immigrants and religious or ethnic 
minorities, who on occasion would find themselves 
the subject of political vilification, would face similarly 
punitive treatment (Lynch 2008).  
On an organizational level, the political conversation on 
crime that undergirded the shift in the portrayal of the 
common criminal was fueled by Southern policymakers 
threatened by the prospect of integration and the end 
of Jim Crow during the civil rights era. Stoking white 
fears of integration, local governments in the South 
published erroneous “crime reports” and laid blame 
on social programs for harboring and even nurturing 
criminality (Lerman and Weaver 2010). The narrative of 
crime emerging from that political climate consistently 
and pointedly spoke of crime and justice in racial terms. 
As Murakawa (2005) observes: “southern Democrats 
opposed civil rights legislation in criminological terms, 
arguing that forced racemixing breeds crime, that civil 
rights legislation rewards black lawbreaking, and that 
blacks are responsible for street crime” (81).  
Linking crime with race and shifting the conversation 
from social equality and development to criminal justice 
and ‘law and order’ resulted in a dilution of the civil 
rights argument, making it possible for the criminal-as-
enemy image to take hold. “The language of lawbreaking 
relied on and promoted a social vision of individual 
failure rooted in moral depravity” (Lerman and Weaver 
2010, 55). This emerging narrative played on public fears 
over personal safety, becoming a force of its own that 
was politically unwise to confront. Thus, more liberal 
political forces who supported integration and social 
reforms became subsumed by the greater criminal justice 
narrative. The political power of these socially constructed 
narratives of crime is clarified by Boushey (2016), who 
suggests that criminal justice policies are congruent with 
“target population” typification, pressuring state and 
local governments to “respond” to the crime issue with 
increasingly punitive “law and order” policies (210-12). 
Another powerful means of developing the common 
narrative of crime and shaping public consciousness is 
the media. Both through journalism (news) and popular 
culture (such as film), the crime narrative has been 
created and dramatized for optimal affect. The media has 
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helped propel this new image of the criminal, described 
as menacing, rogue, irredeemable, and most importantly 
“other” — dark skinned and racially, ethnically, or 
religiously different. Violent crime, being the most prone 
to sensationalism, has firmly occupied the airwaves, 
with the perpetrator nearly always African-American 
(Beckett and Sasson 2004). In fact, in addition to getting 
a larger share of coverage, Beckett and Sasson (2004) 
found African-Americans were “depicted differently” 
than white defendants, often as perpetrators of violent 
crime, pictured “in the physical custody of police” and 
not named, using instead terms such as “suspect” or 
“perpetrator” (79). By contrast, the victims of violent 
crime often are represented as white and female in direct 
contradiction to every statistical trend on violent crime in 
the United States, the overwhelming majority of whose 
victims are black and male (Beckett and Sasson 2004).  
A more recent study conducted in 2014 for “The 
Sentencing Project,” indicates that these racially 
distorted depictions persist despite increased awareness 
of their fallacy and consequences (Ghandnoosh 2014). 
Surveys cited in the study show that white respondents 
overestimated minority criminality by 20 to 30 percent 
and were more likely to view blacks and Latinos as “more 
prone to violence” (Ghandnoosh 2014, 13). The rhetorical 
power of these portrayals and terminology cannot and 
should not be underestimated. White fear of black crime 
is an essential political construct borne out of the throes 
of the segregationist American South and cultivated by 
the media. The “atypical” reporting and representation of 
the perpetrators and victims of crime is “not a product 
of how representative or novel a crime is,” Ghandnoosh 
(2014) suggests, “but rather how well it can be ‘scripted 
using stereotypes grounded in White racism and White 
fear of Black crime’” (Lundman quoted in Ghandnoosh 
2014, 23). This discursive, stereotypical loop self-
substantiates by presenting and subsequently reinforcing 
a particular narrative of crime. Beckett and Sasson 
(2004) observe that the same narrative is extended into 
popular culture in movies, TV dramas, and reality-based 
programming, further cementing the latter. The result is 
not only a distorted representation of violence, but a lack 
of recognition of the disparate minority experiences with 
the justice system compared to whites (see Figure 2).
Similar to the statistical trends of public opinion 
regarding crime, Beckett and Sasson (2004) demonstrate 
an incongruence between coverage of crime and actual 
crime incidence rates. For example, over a period of five 
years starting in 1990 when crime rates, particularly
Figure 2. Source: Ghandnoosh (2014)
homicides and violent crime, had fallen by over ten 
percentage points, “television and newspaper coverage 
of crime increased by more than 400%... [and] network 
news coverage of murder… increased by 336%” (Beckett 
and Sasson 2004). Scholarship abound about the 
“manufacturing” (Surette 2006) of crime “waves” and 
crime “surges” (See Himmelstein 2014; Kappeler and 
Potter 2014; Miller, Potter, and Kappeler 2006).  Instead 
of being rooted in reality, there is a divergence between 
crime incidence and its reporting, thereby creating the 
presumption of a crisis in the absence of it.  
Beckett and Sasson (2004) go further: beyond being a 
conduit for transmission of the crime narrative, “Under 
some circumstances, media personnel may also play 
a direct-role in the policy making process” (87).  They 
cite early research by criminologist Mark Fishman who 
chronicled one such “crime wave” of purported violence 
against the elderly, even though no specific increases 
in crime against the elderly had actually occurred. 
Nevertheless, the media campaign at the time resulted in 
“the creation of new law enforcement squads and tactics, 
the reallocation of public and police resources, and 
the introduction of legislation aimed at protecting the 
elderly” (Beckett and Sasson 2004, 87). It is no surprise 
that the public is receptive to such sensational stories 
of crime — the anomalous and rare event — and this 
insidious power is deserving of more scholarly attention. 
Law enforcement itself is hardly immune to the popular 
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narrative of crime. Officers and agents are, after all, 
members of society exposed to the same narratives 
and the same information as anyone else in the public. 
Though their specialization may afford them access to 
sources of information not readily (if at all) available to 
the public, this information is not part of the average 
officer’s repertoire, and even then requires analysis 
and interpretation to produce meaningful conclusions 
(Maguire and Uchida 2000). Some effort is put into 
re-aligning faulty assumptions in the training process 
(Eterno 2007). This is particularly true of larger law 
enforcement agencies with police academies and 
substantial funding, a category to which a vast majority 
of law enforcement agencies do not belong; however, the 
fundamental assumptions about crime and criminality 
remain the same.  
Incorporating this crime narrative into law enforcement 
has significant consequences, not only on individual 
perceptions, but in enacting these latent assumptions 
in society. Increased scrutiny by law enforcement of 
specific target populations inevitably leads to reduced 
scrutiny of other areas and populations (Michalowski 
2000). In those areas of high scrutiny and contact with 
law enforcement, there is a much higher likelihood of 
uncovering incidence, and the converse is also true. Those 
who experience low contact with law enforcement are 
not represented in criminal populations by virtue of that 
decreased scrutiny. This trend is not necessarily a result of 
a lower rate of criminality overall, therefore perpetuating 
the common narrative of certain populations being 
more readily disposed to violence than others (Reiman 
1984). In essence, the crime narrative has become a self-
fulfilling prophecy of national proportions.  
CONCLUSION
Unfortunately, the skewed narrative and continued 
ambiguity around crime, its origins, and effective ways 
of deterring it serves political purposes. Matters of 
personal security carry the greatest potential for impact 
on individuals, touching on the innate desire for self-
preservation. Politicizing crime allows politicians and 
policy makers to tap into this powerful driver for short-
term political gain. We continue to see that phenomenon 
today with school shootings and the gun control debate 
(Lloyd 2016), the opioid crisis and the ongoing drug war 
(Rodriguez 2018), and varied manifestations of the War 
on Terror (Mancino 2016). Meanwhile, the true factors 
of crime in society, and potential solutions, are given little 
attention. Worse still, the mechanisms, institutions, and 
agencies taxed with protecting the public, ensuring safety, 
and repelling deviance do so with a distorted mandate. 
The law enforcement apparatus continues to operate 
under an outdated narrative of the actors and agents of 
crime and criminality, unnecessarily racializing police 
activities and creating a dichotomy of confrontation. 
The federalization of law enforcement subsumed its 
professionalization, negatively influencing the localized 
strategy and responsiveness needed to effectively police 
and serve communities, while reducing the positive 
effect of professionalization. It has also facilitated the 
politicization of  crime and given outsize power to 
politics and politicians over crime control. 
So long as politics remains the central animating force 
in crime control, truly effective mechanisms for law 
enforcement and a fair and just system will remain elusive. 
However, there are signs of a positive shift. Growing 
public awareness and a reformist wave in political and 
institutional rhetoric suggests that a more effective and 
equal system of crime control may yet be possible. Uggen 
and Larson (2017) state that “the public is making halting 
but steady progress toward becoming smarter, rather than 
tougher, on crime.” Recognizing the inherent fallacies of 
the crime narrative and the politicized shaping of law 
enforcement, which this research has attempted to do, 
is a step in the right direction. Further research in this 
area and on the means and mechanisms of reform and 
reevaluation is needed to discover viable solutions. 
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NOTES
1. Rodney King, a 25-year old African-American, was 
stopped by police following an alleged car chase. While 
attempting to apprehend him, Los Angeles Police 
Department (LAPD) officers were videotaped by a 
local resident brutally beating King, as their colleagues 
looked on. The case led to the scrutiny of the LAPD as 
a department for systemic abuse and misconduct. For 
additional details, see Mydans (1991).  
2. For the purposes of this paper, “the state” is defined as 
polity, an organized political entity (such as the American 
state) rather than the geographical state, i.e. the state of 
Tennessee. 
3. For more on this particular aspect, including a 
discussion on statistical integrity when estimating 
national crime trends, see Mosher, Methe and Hart 
(2011).
4. See Brown v. Board (1958).
5. See Brown v. Board (1958), and to a lesser extent Heart 
of Atlanta Motel v. United States (1964).
6. See Mapp v. Ohio (1961), Gideon v. Wainwright (1963), 
and Miranda v. Arizona (1966).
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APPENDIX
Table 1: Percentage (and rank order) of those responding "crime" of crime combined with such related matters as 
"lawlessness", "law enforcement", "juvenile delinquency", and "immorality."
Source: Scheingold (1984)




Hassan: The Politicization of Crime and its Implications
Published by STARS, 2020
